Resilient Connections for SSH and TLS

Teemu Koponen and Pasi Eronen, HIIT Mikko Särelä, Nokia Research Center Presented by Chakchai So-In (cs5@cse.wustl.edu)

Introduction

- Related work and Goals
- Design principles
- Protocol extensions
- Implementation considerations
- Evaluation
 - Conclusions

Motivation

- Applications have longer uptimes and experience more disruptions.
- Laptop Suspension/Hibernation (long disconnection)
- Switching multiple network interface
- User changes location (change of IP)

Cause the termination of the connection/ application!

Resilient connection

- Resilient connection \rightarrow Session continuity
 - Continue the same session caused by Disconnection
- Implementing at higher layers desirable:
 - Long disconnection periods
 - No network infrastructure required and modified
 - Application get upgraded

Session layer is the lowest layer to implement resilient connection

What is SSH?

SSH (Secure Shell defined in RFC 4346):

- Session protocol for secure remote login and other secure network services
- Provides user/ server authentication and encryption and data integrity protection

What is TLS?

- TLS (Transport Layer Security defined in RFC 2246):
 - Provides communication session privacy (encryption, authentication, and data integrity) over the Internet (WWW)
 - TLS and SSL are most recognized as the protocols that provide secure HTTP (HTTPS) for Internet transactions.
 - SSL (Secure Socket Layer) was developed by Netscape to secure transactions over WWW.
 - Then IETF developed a standard protocol that provided the same functionality. They used SSL 3.0 as the basis for that work, which became the TLS protocol.

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Related work

- Several session continuity on "socket API libraries"
 - E.g. Persistent connections, Mobile TCP socket, Mobile-Socket, Reliable sockets, and Migrate
 - Library placed below socket API: virtual single unbroken connection to real TCP connections
 - Key difference: Deployability
 - Use of out-of-band signaling (separate TCP or UDP session) may require changes in network
 - Separate key exchange to protect the signaling messages -> additional overhead

Goals

- Develop resiliency extensions for the common TLS and SSH protocols
 - Real implementation are in OpenSSH and PureTLS.
 - Emphasize on deployability
- Analyze implementation issues faced when adding the extensions to existing software packages

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Design Principals


- No network changes required
- Incremental deployment possible
- Limited end-point changes (only SSH/TLS)
- Long disconnections supported (>10sec)
 - No handover optimization
- In overall, emphasize on **deployability**

Supporting Deployability


Key Feature	Implication
In-band signaling	Works without changes in current middleboxes
Extension negotiation	Incremental deployment
Only application changed	No infrastructure required
Buffering and explicit ACKs	OS independency
Closing message	Determine if disconnection/ connection termination

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
SSH procedure (initial)




SSH procedure (reconnection)



SSH procedure (closing)



TLS procedure (reconnection)



Security analysis

- Claim: no loss of security
- Shared keys created during the initial SSH or TLS protocol exchange
 - An attacker cannot spoof or modify the reconnect messages.
- Replay attacks are not possible
 - SSH and TLS key exchange messages include fresh *nonces* that are covered by a MAC later during the handshake.

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Client considerations

- When to reconnect/ which interface to use?
 - A manual request, automatically, or preferred network interface becomes available
 - Rely on the operating system's source address selection
 - OpenSSH: A routing socket to monitor routing table changes
 - PureTLS: Polling the OS in regular intervals for the preferred interface

Server considerations

- When is a session discarded?
 - Configurable server-wide timeout (based on local policy)
- What is the server process strategy?
 - Create a new process for each new client connection
 - Maintain table mapping sessions for inter-process communication
 - New process passes state information to the corresponding old process
 - New process has less state to pass.
 - In practice, the new process information is easier to transfer.


Atomic reconnections


- The protocol state machine of an old connection must not become corrupted if an attempt fails.
- New process transfers the state (a file descriptor / sequence numbers) to the old process only after a reconnection request is valid (by using keys in the old process.
 - Server: if a reconnection request is invalid, the old process sees nothing.
 - Client: either reconnection attempt succeeds or no state is affected.


OpenSSH/PureTLS considerations


OpenSSH


- Require state serialization and passing across process boundaries
- PureTLS
 - The complexity are from the requirement to keep the objects visible to the application unchanged over reconnections e.g. additional layer of indirection for Socket.













































SSH process/ reconnecting session





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Scenario

- Manually switches from WLAN to wired Ethernet
 - A client network interface goes down, second comes up, client reconnects.
- Downloads a large file from a remote server
 - Over SFTP (FTP over SSH)
 - Over TLS (FTP over TLS)
- Metric: the actual expected length of typical reconnections





Overhead & complexity

Acknowledgment overhead


- No additional IP packets: SSH/TLS ACKs fits in the same TCP ACKs.
- OpenSSH: Send ACKs every received SSH message
- PureTLS: Send ACKs at the same time as application data
- Implementation complexity
 - Need modification at Server/Client applications
 - OpenSSH 2,200 lines of extension code
 - PureTLS 1,000 lines of extension code

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Conclusion

- Extend SSH and TLS to support resilient connections (Handle long periods of disconnected operation)
- Some principles having an effect to deployability were identified and tested
- Deployability remains a difficult issue.



Issues & Questions here?

Questions?

- ACKs Overhead:
 - A single ACK is 32 bytes in total. Since the SSH transport layer messages can be up to 32 KB: the ACK traffic amounted to less than 0.6% of the whole bandwidth.?
- Laptop Suspension: how can they save all states? Maybe no need since they don't care; just reconnect.
- This work does not talk about how to operate the resilient when the laptop is suspended.

Issues & Questions here?

Questions?

- Also, they assume the old process is always up->find out how to operate when WINDOW is suspended)
- Might be a mechanism to inform the client how long the server will hold the connection based on the local policy -> TLS library either to use this function or not (resilient = no but support)
- No optimization, (At least, do analysis on reconnection part)